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Abstract 
Hannah  Arendt’s  1963  study  “Eichmann  in  Jerusalem”,  based  on  the  former  Nazi’s  1961  trial,  broached  two  highly 
controversial topics: The first was her theory of the banality of evil—the uncomfortable moral scenario that leads ordinary 
individuals,  for  the  most  trivial  and  arbitrary  reasons,  to  commit  heinous  atrocities;  and  the  second  was  her  fierce 
condemnation  of  Jewish  collaboration  with  the  Nazis.  This  paper  argues  that  the  novelist  Jonathan  Littell’s  critically 
acclaimed best‐seller The Kindly Ones (2010) provocatively revalorizes and builds upon these two aspects of Arendt’s study: 
Firstly,  it  posits  her  theory  of  banality  as  a  challenge  to  the  comforting  presupposition  that  terrible  evils  can  only  be 
committed by a minority of monstrous individuals, by suggesting instead that “normal” readers share the same capacity to 
commit  atrocities  as  Nazis  such  as  Eichmann.  Secondly,  the  novel  nuances  Arendt’s  damning  indictment  of  Jewish 
collaboration by regarding it as the inevitable consequence of the terrible predicament faced by Jews at that time. Finally, the 
paper  concludes  with  Littell’s  consideration  of  banality  as  a  phenomenon  that  not  only  invites  an  uncomfortable  moral 
self‐analysis, but also legitimises a return to a justice system based on the ancient Greek model. 
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Margarethe Von Trotta’s recent film Hannah Arendt 
(2012) intelligently re-examines the considerable 
controversy generated by the German philosopher’s 
theory of the banality of evil, based on her detailed 
study of prominent Nazi Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial 
and execution in Israel. It shows how the 
unprecedented moral implications of her theory—that 
even the most unspeakable evil can be carried out by 
an ordinary and thoughtless bureaucrat, not to mention 
her polemical assertion that a number of influential 
Jews collaborated in the Holocaust for questionable 
reasons, led to her brutal ostracisation from the New 
York Jewish community. 
This paper focuses on French educated, Jewish 
American novelist Jonathan Littell’s equally 
controversial but critically acclaimed best-seller, Les 
Bienveillantes (2006), translated into English as The 
Kindly Ones (2010). It argues that Littell’s novel not 
only revalorises Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil 
through the eyes of a former Nazi perpetrator but also 
offers a nuanced reappraisal of the topic of Jewish 
                                                          
aBirkbeck College, University of London, United Kingdom 
 
Correspondent Author:   
Damian  P.  Catani,  Department  of  Cultures  and  Languages, 
Birkbeck College, 43 Gordon Square, Bloomsbury, London, 
WC1H 0PD, United Kingdom 
E‐mail: d.catani@bbk.ac.uk 
DAVID  PUBLISHING 
D 
Sociology  Study  4(8) 
 
662
collaboration. In revealing interviews, Littell has 
suggested two reasons why the phenomenon of 
banality is so central to his novel. The first relates to 
his personal encounter with a Serb colonel and former 
fisherman, while conducting humanitarian work in the 
Balkan conflict of the mid-1990s. The colonel 
explained to him that he bombed Sarajevo, not out of 
a premeditated desire to ethnically cleanse the 
Bosnians, but because they stole his fishing tackle 
from his flat to the value of 20,000 Marks 
(Blumenfeld 2006). This episode led Littell to the 
realisation that an ordinary man, who was not 
intrinsically a monster, but started out as a simple 
fisherman, committed unspeakable evil for the most 
trivial of reasons: petty revenge. The implicit lesson to 
be drawn from this is one of moral 
self-recognitions—a moral self-recognition he elicits 
from the readers of his novel: If he could do it, then so 
could they. Not for nothing did Littell state in the 
same interview that had he been born 30 years earlier, 
he could have become a Nazi. Secondly, in a separate 
interview in the French newspaper Le Figaro 
(Georgesco 2007), Littell asserts that recent Holocaust 
historians, such as Christopher Browning, who in the 
last 15-20 years have commendably turned their 
attention to the perpetrators, have nevertheless fallen 
into the trap of underestimating the psychological 
specificity and arbitrariness of their actions (Browning 
1992). 
Such historians have naively placed their trust in 
the reliability of documentary sources, chiefly those 
interviews provided by the Nazis themselves, to 
conclude that many of the perpetrators were ordinary 
men and women who killed out of a basic obedience 
to authority and peer pressure, even if they found 
these actions morally reprehensible. Littell fully 
acknowledges that such first-hand testimonies often 
provide accurate and vital details about the 
implementation of the terrible events that took place in 
the death camps; but what they fail to do, he suggests, 
is truly revealing the full range of individual 
psychological motivations behind these events, 
because they tend to reduce banality to the “logic of 
obedience”. This is because, that George Bataille 
points out “The perpetrators have no voice, or if they 
do speak, it is with the voice of the state”. Statements 
made by perpetrators, in other words, tell us very little 
about their own intentions, because they invariably 
transfer responsibility for individual crimes onto a 
higher authority such as the state or party—this, of 
course, was Eichmann’s notorious defence, analysed 
by Arendt: “I was only following orders”. If Bataille 
is correct, as Littell believes he is, then the supposedly 
“authentic” documented voice of the real perpetrators 
is merely an expedient, a self-justificatory explanation 
that conceals the real reasons why they commit evil, 
reasons which according to Littell are often far more 
complex, unpredictable and surprisingly banal than 
are generally assumed. This does not mean to say that 
there were not people who killed solely out of 
ideological fanaticism such as Nazism, or 
anti-Semitism; but in many cases, as we shall see, 
such atrocities are carried out by individuals who 
initially seem as unremarkable and morally innocuous 
as any other member of society and simply end up 
killing for money, self-advancement, or some other 
perfectly ordinary reason that stretches credulity 
precisely because its trivial nature seems 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the act 
committed. This is why his fictional first-person 
narrator, former SS officer Max Aue, provides greater 
psychological insight into the banality of 
evil—especially that of notorious Nazi Adolf 
Eichmann than the documentary historians. 
THE BANALITY OF EVIL 
As a former SS officer now hiding in France, Aue is 
in a sense the very antithesis of the plausible or real 
perpetrator. Far from seeking to escape responsibility 
for his acts or those of his fellow Nazis, Aue is willing 
to both admit to his individual guilt and give a “warts 
Catani 
 
663
and all” explanation of the multitude of arbitrary and 
often trivial reasons that tragically led to “la Shoah”. 
Thus, those who accuse Littell of having created an 
implausible character are missing the point. It is Aue’s 
very implausibility, such as his unconventional sexual 
tastes—in particular, his homosexuality and 
incestuous attachment to his sister—and his purely 
fictional, as opposed to historical, existence that 
makes his perspective on the banality of evil 
paradoxically more compelling and truthful than any 
“real” witness testimony. Yet this does not mean to 
say that Littell did not thoroughly research the 
historical setting of his novel, nor that he confines 
himself to fictional as opposed to real characters. He 
also provides a psychological insight into the actions 
and motives of real Nazis such as Eichmann; but he 
chooses to reconstruct these historical figures as 
semi-fictional characters in a way that authentically 
lays bare their possible psychological motives, rather 
than exclusively confining himself to what they said 
in historical testimonies, which merely skim the 
surface of these motives. 
In a knowing nod toward Hannah Arendt’s 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, Littell consciously revisits 
the notion of the banality of evil through his detailed 
semi-fictionalised reconstruction of Adolf Eichmann. 
Through the eyes of Max Aue, Littell offers us a 
nuanced, in-depth psychological portrait of Eichmann 
that stresses the dangerous combination of his sheer 
“ordinariness” and efficient bureaucratic mentality, 
both of which made him a prime candidate for 
succumbing to social ambition and the trappings of 
power. In his public role, Eichmann puts on an act. 
His voice and mannerisms become affected when he 
talks to Jews, he enjoys patronising and shocking 
them with a combination of exaggerated politeness 
and swear-words; he charms and fraternises with 
Hungarian high society, thoroughly enjoying 
invitations to their castles and being treated as an 
equal in the company of countesses. But in private, the 
self-important delusions of grandeur that Eichmann 
displays in public are debunked by a reminder of his 
distinctly non-aristocratic origins as a humble 
policeman, of his extreme bureaucratic fastidiousness 
and prudence, his deference to social rank combined 
with envy, ambition, and a fondness for the bottle: 
(…) he forgot his deepest nature, which of a bureaucrat 
of talent, even of great talent in his limited field. Yet as soon 
as you saw him one-on-one, in his office, or in the evening, 
if he had a little to drink, he became the old Eichmann again, 
the one who scuttled about the offices of the Staatspolizei, 
respectful, busy, impressed by the slightest stripe superior to 
his own and at the same time devoured by envy and 
ambition, the Eichmann who had himself covered in writing, 
for each action and each decision (…) and who kept all his 
orders in a safe, carefully arranged, the Eichmann who 
would have been just as happy—and no less 
efficient—buying or transporting horses or trucks, if that had 
been his task, as concentrating an evacuating tens of 
thousands of human beings destined to die. (Littell 2010: 
786) 
Rather like the Serb colonel Littell encountered in 
his own life, the Eichmann that he reconstructs here is 
a boringly efficient, unremarkable, and mediocre man. 
And the surprising extent of his ordinariness is 
matched by the equally baffling arbitrariness and lack 
of moral reflection that lies behind his choice of career. 
We are confronted by the frightening possibility that 
Eichmann could just as competently and willingly 
have pursued a career in buying and transporting 
horses or lorries as in ordering the mass extermination 
of Jews. The narrator is suggesting the profoundly 
unnerving moral possibility that the difference 
between committing genocide and accomplishing 
menial tasks is purely incidental, and in no way 
contingent on the intrinsic moral qualities or choices 
of the individual. Eichmann’s mediocrity and 
thoughtlessness are further emphasised by his superior, 
Winkelmann: “He (Eichmann) does not have the 
slightest scruple about exceeding the limits of his 
authority, if he believes he’s acting in the spirit of the 
person giving him his orders” (Littell 2010: 723). 
Eichmann, in other words, is motivated by satisfying 
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those in power. The extremity of his acts derives not 
from any intrinsic predisposition toward evil, but 
nothing more banal than gaining the favour of his 
superiors. By succumbing to the all too human traits 
of vanity, ambition, and thoughtlessness, he is not 
presented as an intrinsically evil individual, merely a 
weak one who becomes enmeshed in unspeakable acts. 
And this is Littell’s point: If an ordinary bureaucrat 
like Eichmann can be involved in the genocide, why 
not everybody else? His unnervingly plausible tableau 
of the banality of evil in no way seeks to minimise the 
suffering of the victims or exonerate the perpetrators; 
rather he alerts his readers to the frightening 
possibility that those whom they would feel more 
comfortable in labelling as genocidal maniacs have 
the same human foibles as them, and thus perhaps 
they brought to the realisation that they too, are 
potentially closer to perpetuating genocide than they 
would like to think. 
Unsurprisingly, this is the aspect of Arendt’s 
theory of banality that has proved most unsettling to 
her readers because it demands from them an 
unprecedented level of moral self-scrutiny that 
completely shatters their commonly held belief that an 
evil as horrendous as the Holocaust could only be 
committed by a small minority of despicable 
individuals with whom they have absolutely nothing 
in common. Littell’s novel, however, shows this 
assumption to be based not on reality, but on moral 
disingenuousness. Specifically, a disingenuousness 
that reflects a fundamental human needs to perceive 
oneself as morally good. In other words, society’s 
overriding tendency to identify evil with individuals 
that can be categorised as radically different from the 
“norm” in every respect—people who for instance can 
be labelled as “monsters” or “fanatics”—is the most 
expedient and reassuring way it has at its disposal to 
disassociate and exonerate itself from the types of evil 
they commit. 
Aue, however, denies his readers this reassurance 
by confronting them with one of the most blatant 
examples of their moral disingenuousness. Namely, 
their assumption that ideological fanaticism is a 
precondition for participation in the Holocaust: 
(…) even if, objectively, there was no doubt about the 
final aim, it wasn’t with this aim in mind that most of the 
participants were working, it wasn’t that which motivated 
them and drove them to work so energetically and 
single-mindedly, it was a whole gamut of emotions. (Littell 
2010: 781) 
Aue makes an important distinction here between 
culpability and motivation. On one hand, he makes it 
quite clear that all those who participated in the final 
solution did so knowingly and fully mindful of its 
ultimate sinister aim; on the other hand, he makes it 
equally clear that this collective guilt is not the 
necessary consequence of a shared motivation. Those 
who participated did so for reasons that were far more 
personal, complex, and varied in origin than a 
common ideological goal, even in the case of as senior 
and apparently uncompromising a Nazi as Eichmann. 
Aue systematically dismantles the myth that the 
Holocaust was the result of a coherent, transparent 
policy efficiently implemented and coordinated by a 
self-contained group of like-minded Nazi ideologues. 
The reality is far more cynical, fragmented, and murky. 
Many participated for self-serving reasons that had 
less to do with ideology than the competing interests 
of different bureaucratic bodies, agencies, or 
individuals. The Hungarian bureaucracy, for instance, 
“just wanted to see the Jews leave Hungary but didn’t 
give a fuck about what would happen to them”; Speer, 
the Minister of Armaments and War Production and 
his colleague Kammler, the high-ranking SS officer, 
wanted Jews who could work, but could not have 
cared less “about the ones who could not work”; the 
specialists in the Ministry of Food “saw the 
evacuation of the Jews… as a measure that would 
allow Hungary to free up a surplus of wheat for 
Germany” (Littell 2010: 782). For one particular 
expert from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 
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“feeding the inmates and other foreign workers in 
Germany, that wasn’t his business, and for him the 
evacuation of the Jews was the solution to his problem, 
even if it became someone else’s problem in turn” 
(Littell 2010: 783). 
What emerges here is a depressing portrait of the 
Holocaust as the culmination of a highly volatile, 
socially Darwinist climate of cynical expediency and 
ruthlessly competitive power politics. It quickly 
becomes apparent that responsibility for the genocide 
cannot conveniently be limited to a handful of 
homogeneous, easily identifiable Nazi fanatics who 
can swiftly be demonised and kept at arm’s length; 
rather, this responsibility must be shared amongst a 
heterogeneous and disparate group of individuals 
comprising both Nazis and other members of society, 
and each of whom has his or her own specific agenda 
or axe to grind. Evil is thus shown to be the domain 
not just of the few, as “normal” society would like to 
believe, but of the many. Any attempts by society to 
“immunise” itself from evil by projecting it 
exclusively onto the Nazi, “other” are thus revealed to 
be disingenuous and factually inaccurate. 
But this disingenuousness, Aue suggests, is not 
only confined to the supposedly innocent, anti-Nazi 
moral majority, but also extends to the Nazis 
themselves. If as has been argued, a common mistake 
is to assume fanatical adherence to Nazi ideology to 
be a precondition for participation in the Holocaust, 
then by the same token, it must also be recognised that 
even those who proudly profess to be die-hard Nazi 
ideologues, such as Eichmann, are themselves deluded 
about their own true motives. No more is this apparent 
than in the impassioned conference speech Eichmann 
delivers to his colleagues soon after his appointment 
as head of Jewish affairs in Hungary, a speech in 
which he warns them, in the pseudo-scientific, 
incendiary language typical of anti-Semitic, Nazi 
racial theory of the fierce resistance of the Jewish 
ghettos and hence of the pressing need to eradicate 
this “germ-like” race.  
He (Heydrich) knew that the strongest Jews, the 
toughest, the cleverest, and the wiliest, would escape 
all selections and would be the hardest to destroy. And 
it is precisely those who form the vital reservoir from 
which Jewry could spring back, the germ cell for 
Jewish regeneration, as the late Obbengruppenführer 
said. Our struggle prolongs that of Koch and 
Pasteur—we have to follow it through to the end… 
(Littell 2010: 777; Dederichs 2009: 92)1. 
At first blush, this speech epitomises what Arendt 
identifies as Eichmann’s self-proclaimed idealism: It 
recalls his defiant declaration during his police 
examination in Israel that he would, if necessary, have 
been perfectly willing to sacrifice the life of his own 
father to the greater glory of the Third Reich (Arendt 
1965: 41-42)2. But Aue knows better than to take 
Eichmann’s ideological rant at face value. By this 
stage, he has developed sufficient insight into his 
personality through their close working relationship in 
Hungary to recognise that Eichmann’s rhetorical 
flourish is too out of character not to indicate the 
underlying presence of more complicated psychological 
traits: namely, vanity, ambition, and self-importance. 
In other words, perceived purely on its own terms as 
an instrument of Nazi propaganda, Eichmann’s speech 
is more than plausible enough to convince others, (let 
alone himself) of his exemplary fanaticism; but when 
viewed from the psychological standpoint of an 
insecure and narcissistic personality, this speech can 
also be understood as one big ego-trip, an expression 
of the intoxication of power brought about by his 
recent promotion and consequent craving for approval: 
A thunder of applause welcomed these words. Did 
Eichmann really believe in them? It was the first time I 
heard him talk this way, and I had the impression that he had 
got carried away, let himself be swept along by his new role, 
that he liked the game so much that he ended up becoming 
one with it. (Littell 2010: 777) 
Once again, Littell’s forensic analysis of 
Eichmann as the most notorious example of Arendt’s 
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theory of the banality of evil invites a reconsideration 
of established moral assumptions about the Holocaust 
by paying heed to a plethora of complex motives that 
have far more to do with a flawed individual 
psychology than political conviction. 
JEWISH COLLABORATION 
A second, equally controversial aspect of Arendt’s 
study, with which Littell also engages in his novel, is 
the thorny question of Jewish collaboration with the 
Nazis. Arendt, following Ralf Hilberg (Arendt 1965: 
118), was among the first to tackle this troubling 
historical reality head on, and she did so in an 
uncompromisingly moralistic tone that further 
incurred the wrath of those who already objected to 
her theory of the banality of evil.  
Few would quibble with Arendt’s clear-headed 
account of the Nazi motives for seeking cooperation 
with the Jews, which were unapologetically cynical 
and pragmatic: namely, bureaucratic and economic 
expediency. Jewish collaboration would minimise the 
administrative chaos and severe drain on German 
manpower that resulted from the rounding up of Jews; 
it would also, especially in the latter part of the war, 
provide able-bodied Jewish workers for the 
increasingly stretched armaments factories (Arendt 
1965: 104). But where Arendt caused anger, and 
continues to do so this day, is over her unequivocal 
condemnation of Jewish leaders for collaborating with 
the Nazis: “Wherever Jews lived, there were 
recognized Jewish leaders, and this leadership, almost 
without exception, co-operated one way or another, 
for one reason or another, with the Nazis” (Arendt 
1965: 125). Her forthright language spares none of the 
Jewish leaders, all of whom she castigates on two 
grounds. Their supposed enjoyment of the power with 
which they were entrusted and their naïve 
miscalculation that sacrificing a number of 
able-bodied Jews to the Nazis would save a great 
many more from certain extermination: 
In the Nazi-inspired, but not Nazi-dictated, manifestoes 
they issued, we can still sense how they enjoyed their new 
power—“The Central Jewish Council has been granted the 
right of absolute disposal over all Jewish manpower”, as the 
first announcement of the Budapest Council phrased it. We 
know how the Jewish officials felt when they became 
instruments of murder—like captains “whose ships were 
about to sink and succeeded in bringing them safe to port by 
casting overboard a great part of their precious cargo”; like 
saviours who “with a hundred victims save a thousand 
people, with a thousand ten thousand”. (Arendt 1965: 118) 
It is deeply ironic that what Arendt denounces in 
the Jewish Councils is the very same intoxication of 
power as Littell diagnoses in Eichmann. But she also 
provides empirical evidence to suggest that the 
“sacrificial logic” of prominent Jewish leaders such as 
Kastner, the Zionist who collaborated with Eichmann 
in Hungary, only later to be utterly discredited by an 
Israeli court trial and ultimately shot dead, 
spectacularly backfired: “The truth was even more 
gruesome. Dr. Kastner, in Hungary, for instance, 
saved exactly 1,684 people with approximately 
476,000 victims” (Arendt 1965: 118). 
Indeed, Kastner, who also features on several 
occasions in Littell’s novel, is further singled out by 
Arendt for pursuing the same policy of social 
discrimination as the Nazis themselves when it came 
to determining which Jews should or should not be 
saved: “Kastner was proud of his success in saving 
‘prominent Jews’, a category officially introduced by 
the Nazis in 1942, as though in his view too, it went 
without saying that a famous Jew had more right to 
stay alive than an ordinary one” (Arendt 1965: 132). 
In the same vein as Arendt, Littell broaches the 
question of Jewish collaboration (as indeed he does 
her theory of banality) through the lens of Eichmann’s 
psychology, focusing in particular on his attitudes to 
specific Jewish collaborators such as Kastner. Given 
his status as a prominent Nazi, we would expect 
Eichmann to despise the Zionist leader. And yet, 
paradoxically, as Arendt perceptively suggests, it is 
precisely because of his Nazism rather than despite 
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that he actually grows to admire and respect him. For 
he identifies in Kastner’s Zionism that the same 
uncompromising idealism and policy of discrimination 
that he proudly upholds as the benchmarks of Nazi 
racial theory: 
The greatest “idealist” Eichmann ever encountered 
among the Jews was Dr. Rudolf Kastner, with whom he 
negotiated during the Jewish deportations from Hungary and 
with whom he came to an agreement that he, Eichmann, 
would permit the “illegal” departure of a few thousand Jews 
to Palestine (the trains were in fact guarded by German 
police) in exchange for quiet and order in the camps from 
which hundreds of thousands were shipped to Auschwitz. 
The few thousand saved by the agreement, prominent Jews 
and members of the Zionist youth organizations, were, in 
Eichmann’s words, “the best biological material”. Dr. 
Kastner, as Eichmann understood it, had sacrificed his 
fellow-Jews to his “idea”, and this was as it should be. 
(Arendt 1965: 42) 
Arendt’s provocative analysis of Eichmann’s 
blinkered attitude to collaboration prefigures a passage 
in The Kindly Ones in which Aue similarly observes 
his colleague’s unmistakable admiration for Kastner, 
in whose staunch Zionism he also identifies the exact 
counterpart to his inflexible, racially selective Nazism: 
Eichmann claimed he was very impressed by his 
coldness and his ideological rigour and thought that if 
Kastner had been a German, he would have made a very 
good officer in the Staatspolizei, which for him was 
probably the highest compliment possible. “He thinks like us, 
that Kastner”, he said to me one day. “He thinks only about 
the biological potential of his race, he is ready to sacrifice all 
the old to save the young, the strong, the fertile women. He 
thinks about the future of his race. I said to him: “Me, if I 
were Jewish, I’d have been a Zionist, a fanatical Zionist, like 
you”. (Littell 2010: 798)  
As a further indication of his implicit debt to 
Arendt, Littell therefore mines Eichmann’s 
psychology in order to achieve a more subtle 
understanding of the Nazi motives for collaborating 
with the Jews. But when it comes to examining the 
opposite perspective—the reasons why the Jews chose 
to collaborate with the Nazis—Littell takes a far more 
nuanced and empathetic stance than Arendt. Arendt 
deliberately quotes Judge Benjamin Halevi, who 
presided over Kastner’s trial in Israel, in order to vilify 
the Zionist leader as the man who “sold his soul to the 
devil” (Arendt 1965: 143). She makes absolutely no 
concession to the complex moral predicament in 
which Kastner found himself. Such a view contrasts 
markedly with that of Littell’s central narrator—Max 
Aue, who, despite his status as a former Nazi, is 
prepared to acknowledge and even praise Kastner’s 
actions as those of a highly courageous, dignified, and 
self-possessed man:  
An impressive man, always perfectly elegant, who dealt 
with us as equals, with a complete disregard for his own life, 
which gave him a certain strength when confronted with us: 
No-one could make him afraid (there were attempts, he was 
arrested many times, by the staatspolizei or by the 
Hungarians). (Littell 2010: 798) 
What is more, with respect to the so-called “blood 
for wares” negotiations (where Jewish lives would be 
spared in exchange for 10,000 trucks supplied to the 
crumbling German army) (Arendt 1965: 144); Aue 
credits Kastner and his fellow Zionist collaborators 
with a lucidly pragmatic and realistic attitude to the 
fate of the Jews, who could not even count on the 
support of ostensibly friendly countries to provide 
them with a safe haven from Nazi oppression:  
The Zionists, I suspect, and Kastner in the lead, must 
have understood right away that it was a lure, but also a lure 
that could serve their own interests, let them gain time. They 
were lucid, realistic men, they must have known as well as 
the Reichsführer that not only would no enemy country ever 
agree to deliver 10 thousand trucks to Germany, but also that 
no country, even at that time, was ready to welcome a 
million Jews either. (Littell 2010: 796) 
By adopting a balanced and empathetic attitude to 
the Jewish collaborators, Littell’s novel has far more 
in common with recent critics of Arendt’s stance than 
with Arendt herself, thereby suggesting his greater 
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familiarity with the more accurate, up-to-date 
historiography on the subject, such as that recently 
provided by Tony Judt. Judt particularly takes Arendt 
to task for what he considers to be her gross 
insensitivity to the predicament of the Jews and her 
sweeping historical generalisations—especially her 
exaggeration of the power that the Jewish leaders had 
at their disposal and their grasp of the terrible events 
going on around them: 
Copious research on the Judenrate, the Jewish councils 
of Nazi-dominated Europe, suggests what should have been 
obvious at the time: Arendt knew little about the subject and 
some of her remarks about Jewish “responsibility” were 
insensitive and excessive, but there is a troubling moral 
question mark hanging over the prominent Jews who took on 
the task of administering the ghettos. She was not wrong to 
raise the matter, nor was she mistaken in some of her 
judgements; but she was indifferent, perhaps callously so, to 
the dilemmas Jews faced at the time, and was 
characteristically provocative, even “perverse” (as the 
historian Henry Feingold put it) in insisting on the powers of 
the Jewish leaders and neglecting to call due attention to 
their utter helplessness and, in many cases, their real 
ignorance of the fate that awaited the Jews. (Judt 2008: 82) 
Judt’s more measured tone echoes The Kindly 
Ones in its call for a pragmatic empathy for which 
Arendt’s critique makes absolutely no allowance.  
And yet if Littell, as already suggested, 
provocatively reconstructs Eichmann’s psychology 
via his central narrator Aue in order to revivify and 
nuance debate on the two most controversial aspects 
of Arendt’s study—her theory of the banality of evil 
and the question of Jewish collaboration, these are by 
no means the only aspects of his novel to have 
troubled critics. Another, more immediate source of 
disquiet is his choice of a central narrator as 
perpetrator rather than victim. Susan Suleiman 
pertinently notes that such a move is still considered 
by many to be taboo in the Holocaust novel, which 
remains a genre that—with a few notable exceptions, 
overwhelmingly privileges the voice of the victim 
over that of the perpetrator (Suleiman 2009: 1-2)3. It is 
perhaps no surprise, therefore Claude Lanzmann, the 
maker of the most famous French documentary about 
the Holocaust Shoah (Lanzmann 1985), who has 
provided such a moving testimony to the suffering of 
its victims, should have taken particular exception to 
the narration of this atrocity through the eyes of a 
former SS officer. Lanzmann has stated that even to 
entrust the task of bearing witness to the Holocaust to 
a Nazi, as opposed to the Jewish victims or those who 
survived them is an ethical aberration. He also 
legitimately points out that Littell’s fascination with 
sexual perversity and the grotesque is both distasteful 
and irresponsible because it does not make his central 
protagonist Aue a believable character and thus 
invalidates the moral force of his argument. Nor is it 
responsible or realistic to portray an SS officer who is 
so cultured and well read, since this makes him 
dangerously attractive to the reader. 
Lanzmann and the critic Paul-Eric Blanrue 
(Blanrue 2006) strongly object to the novel on the 
basis that the central character is too refined and 
perverse to be credible, a flaw that they regard as 
logically inconsistent with Littell’s emphasis on the 
ordinariness or banality of evil. But perhaps, deep 
down, this accusation of implausibility acts as a 
convenient smokescreen for their real moral concern. 
Littell could in fact be right, that the gap between 
perpetrator and victim is actually far narrower than is 
commonly assumed, and that the Max Aues of this 
world, whom law-abiding society would prefer to 
demonise and keep at arms length, are not so far 
removed from this respectable society in their capacity 
to commit evil. Lanzmann and Blanrue, therefore, 
arguably succumb to the same moral disingenuousness 
discussed above and to which all human beings are 
unfortunately prone; a disingenuousness that makes it 
far easier to think of Aue as a freak or a “monster”, 
because by doing so, he is placed in a restricted, 
enclosed category of immorality that is unequivocally 
different from that to which the moral majority 
belongs. By finding evidence of his singularity and 
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difference, it is possible to maintain and legitimise the 
reassuring gap that separates those who commit evil 
from those who do not, the vile perpetrators from the 
innocent victims; maintaining this divide avoids 
having to confront the unnerving possibility that there 
is potential within every member of society to commit 
the same evil.  
This blurring of boundaries between victim and 
perpetrator, or more precisely between perpetrator and 
non-perpetrator, is confirmed by the implicit literary 
intertext (from Villon and Baudelaire) that opens 
Littell’s novel: “Oh my human brothers, let me tell 
you how it happened” (Littell 2010: 3). The 
confessional tone of the SS officer and his appeal to a 
shared fraternity that includes both himself and his 
readers is a tactic for morally implicating the reader in 
the evils described within the text. The reader is 
morally ensnared by the text, confronted by the 
unnerving realisation that she is complicit in the evils 
committed by those “monsters” about whom she reads. 
Littell gradually erodes the comforting barriers that 
readers and interpreters of the Holocaust have erected 
between themselves and those individuals who carried 
out such unspeakable atrocities. They naturally want 
to keep these barbarians at arm’s length, yet 
reluctantly recognise in their psychology certain 
characteristics that recall their own “dark side”. This 
point is further reinforced by his suggestion that the 
banality of evil is a characteristic of most perpetrators: 
There are psychopaths everywhere, all the time. Our 
quiet suburbs are crawling with paedophiles and maniacs, 
our homeless shelters are packed with raving megalomaniacs; 
and some of them do indeed become a problem, they kill 
two, three, 10, even 50 people—and then the very same state 
that without batting an eye send them to war crushes them 
like a blood-swollen mosquito. These sick men are nothing. 
But the ordinary men that make up the state—especially in 
unstable times—now there’s the real danger. The real danger 
for mankind is me, is you. (Littell 2010: 21) 
This passage is shocking on two counts: Firstly, 
because of contrary to Eichmann and the historically 
documented perpetrators of “la Shoah”, this narrator 
makes no attempt to excuse the atrocities he and his 
associates have committed by hiding behind the “logic 
of obedience”; secondly, because he implies that the 
real dangers to society are not obvious criminals or 
delinquents, but ordinary people such as the reader 
himself. In other words, while evil on this scale is 
clearly inexcusable (and more could have been done 
by the SS authorities to restrain its most extreme 
perpetrators) (Littell 2010: 19), the real problem is 
that everyone is potentially capable of committing it. 
Paradoxically, it is not the obvious candidates society 
normally demonises as monsters that it should be 
wary of—the “loose canons” such as paedophiles or 
psychopaths, but rather society itself. If readers cannot 
understand this point, he warns, then they should 
proceed no further with the novel. 
THE RETURN TO ANCIENT GREEK 
JUSTICE   
Yet Littell’s focus on banality serves not only to elicit 
moral self-recognition of evil in the individual reader, 
but also as a basis from which to establish objective 
universal criteria for evaluating and punishing war 
crimes, criteria he believes are to be found in the 
ancient Greek system of justice: 
With the Judaeo-Christian approach we are saddled with 
wrongdoing and sin, caught up in the complex interplay 
between sinful thoughts and sinful acts. The Greeks had a far 
more straightforward attitude. This is the point I make in the 
book: When Oedipus kills Laos, he doesn’t know it’s his 
father, but the gods couldn’t care less: You killed your father 
(…). Intention doesn’t come into it. This is exactly the 
approach that was adopted in the war trials, and it’s the only 
way of doing it. This particular bloke committed this 
particular act. The reason why he committed it is immaterial. 
Whether he acted in good faith, or bad faith, whether he did 
it for money or out of conviction, that’s his problem: He 
committed this act, he will be judged and sentenced. That’s 
it. In the end, some people were executed, others sent to jail, 
some of them were released; there were even those who 
escaped arrest altogether... It’s not fair. Too bad. That’s just 
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the way the process goes. Guilt has nothing to do with it. 
(Georgesco 2007) 
In this interview, Littell draws on Greek justice to 
bring into sharp relief the fundamental moral problem 
raised by the banality of evil: the impossibility of 
establishing clear criminal intent. We have seen on the 
contrary, the sheer arbitrariness and thoughtlessness 
that has often led to these atrocities. Crimes can result 
from ideological conviction, greed, envy, ambition, 
expediency, and career choice, but not necessarily 
from a clear premeditated desire to commit evil. The 
Judaeo-Christian moral notion of justice is thus 
ill-suited to judging this banality of evil because it 
seeks not only to establish evil acts, but also evil 
intentions, intentions which, as we have seen, are very 
difficult to pin down. Questions of intentionality 
revolving around sin and culpability plague 
Judaeo-Christian ethics in a way that they were not 
those of Ancient Greece. How, for instance, does one 
pinpoint evil intentions in the long and tortuous chain 
of command that constitutes the impersonal bureaucratic 
mechanism behind the act of genocide? It is very 
difficult to attribute responsibility to one person for 
the gassing of Jews since nurses, doctors, technicians, 
cleaners, labourers, police officers, train drivers, and 
railway signalmen—all those who worked near or 
within the gas chambers, or facilitated the transport of 
Jews to their terrible fate, or disposed of their corpses 
or registered their deaths, had their allotted roles and 
followed specific orders; how does one apportion 
individual criminal intent for these acts, among a 
collectivity of individuals whose exact job descriptions 
may have been different, but who were all directly or 
indirectly engaged in the same mass process of 
extermination?  
Questioned after the war, each one of these people 
said: What, me, guilty? The worker who opened the 
gas spigot, the man closest to the act of murder in both 
time and space, was fulfilling a technical function 
under the supervision of his superiors and doctors. 
The workers who cleaned out the room were 
performing a necessary sanitary job—and a highly 
repugnant one at that. The policeman was following 
his procedure, which is to record each death and 
certify that it has taken place without any violation of 
the laws in force. So who is guilty? Everyone, or no 
one (Littell 2010: 19). 
All these people, one way or another, were 
involved in the genocide, and some like the cleaners, 
were less directly involved than others, such as those 
who operated the gas valves; yet to try to subdivide or 
mitigate the guilt of particular individuals according to 
their different job descriptions is as suspect as trying 
to hide behind the excuse of “following orders”. 
Littell’s suggestion that the Nuremberg Trials sensibly 
chose to focus on acts rather than intentions which is 
confirmed by Aue’s own summary of these trials in 
the preface to the novel: “Why hand the interior 
minister Frick and not his subordinate Stuckart, who 
did all his work for him? A lucky man, that Stuckart, 
who only stained his hands with ink, never with blood” 
(Littell 2010: 20). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In light of the above examples of Nazi perpetrators 
provided by Littell via his main protagonist Aue, what 
moral conclusions, then, can be drawn? And more 
specifically, just how seriously can these conclusions 
be taken when they are based on an ancient Greek 
model of justice whose focus on evil acts, rather than 
intentions, appears to allow certain perpetrators to get 
off astonishingly lightly, while others are more 
severely punished for no apparent reason. The answer, 
quite simply, is that this straightforward approach to 
justice is—no pun intended, the lesser of two evils. If, 
as has been demonstrated, establishing culpability and 
intention is practically impossible, especially when the 
ready-made excuse “I was only following orders” is 
inevitably used, as it was by Eichmann, then the only 
solution is to condemn people for the acts they 
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commit, irrespective of whether these “acts” are 
understood to be only indirectly linked to the killings, 
directly linked, writing out orders, or merely 
following them. Some apparently harsh sentences may 
well result from this approach, but that is too bad: 
“that is just the way the process goes”, as Littell says 
in the interview passage quoted above. Littell seems to 
be advocating a system of justice that accepts a 
necessary degree of arbitrariness that is commensurate 
with the arbitrariness inherent to the banality of evil 
itself, and in this regard, his solution is perhaps more 
pragmatic—or at least more satisfying to secularists, 
than the Judaeo-Christian conception of justice that is 
focused on criminal intent. And in a quite different 
context—that of the oppressed Jewish victim rather 
than the Nazi perpetrator, Littell demonstrates this 
same moral pragmatism when he adopts a nuanced 
and empathetic attitude toward the thorny question of 
Jewish collaboration. However abhorrent this 
collaboration may have seemed to Arendt, certain 
allowances have to made for the terrible dilemmas and 
genuine fears with which the Jewish leaders were 
faced at that time. In conclusion, the ultimate success 
and originality of Littell’s novel thus lie in its capacity 
to morally engage his readers at three intricately 
related levels: Firstly, it invites them, via the notion of 
banality, to delve into some uncomfortable truths about 
their shared susceptibility to immoral actions; secondly, 
it poses some difficult but necessary questions about 
what constitutes a morally acceptable course of action 
in the most extreme circumstances any human being 
can face: the threat of imminent extinction; and thirdly, 
in light of how the Nazi perpetrators of this terrible 
extermination were subsequently tried at Nuremberg, 
it harnesses the banality of evil—a major contributing 
factor to their heinous crimes, to a fruitful and timely 
re-examination of the modern justice system. Littell’s 
tone and subject matter may well have proven too 
controversial for some, but they have a serious and 
underlying ethical agenda that remains highly relevant 
to the post-holocaust world in which we live today. 
Notes 
1. Reinhard Heydrich, one of the main architects of the 
Holocaust, and to whom Eichmann refers in this speech 
reconstructed by Littell, is considered by historians to be 
the most sinister figure of the Nazi elite. Even Hitler 
described him as “the man with the iron heart” (Dederichs 
2009). 
2. Arendt describes Eichmann’s self-professed idealism thus: 
An idealist, according to Eichmann’s notions, was not 
merely a man who believed in an idea or someone who did 
not steal or accept bribes though these qualifications were 
indispensable. An “idealist” was a man who lived for his 
idea—hence he could not be a businessman, and who was 
prepared to sacrifice for his idea everything and, especially, 
everybody (…). The perfect “idealist”, like everybody else, 
had of course his personal feelings and emotions, but he 
would never permit them to interfere with his actions if 
they came into conflict with his “idea” (Arendt 1965: 
41-42).  
3. Among the few works focusing exclusively or partially on 
the subjectivity of perpetrators rather than victims Suleiman 
cites Robert Merle’s La mort est mon métier (1952), Jorge 
Borge’s short story Ein Deutsches Requiem (1949), George 
Steiner’s The Portage to San Cristobal of A.H. (1981), 
David Grossman’s See Under: Love (1989), Martin Amis’s 
Time’s Arrow (1991) as well as Steven Spielberg’s film 
Schindler’s List (1993) and Oliver Hirschbiegel’s Der 
Untergang (2004) (Suleiman 2009).  
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